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THE VIOLENT PERSECUTION OF THE
IRANIAN BAHÁ&ÍS: A CALL TO TAKE A
HUMAN CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO
DEFINING GENOCIDE
INTRODUCTION

O

n September 25, 2016, in a gruesome act of violence, two
men murdered sixty-three year old Farhang Amiri at his
home in Yazd, Iran, solely because he was a member of the
Bahá’í faith.1 The night before his murder, two accomplices arrived at his doorstep claiming to have arranged to purchase a
car.2 MrK Amiri’s son answered the door and immediately became
skeptical of the two men, telling them repeatedly that he was
not aware that his father had a car on sale, but they persisted. 3
Finally, he asked for their contact information so that he could
relay a message to his father and they quickly made an excuse
and left.4 The following evening, neighbors heard Mr. Amiri
screaming and found him with multiple stab wounds to the
chest.5 Mr. Amiri had been attacked by the same two men who
arrived at his doorstep the night before.6 In the wake of the attack, a representative for the Bahá’í International Community7
1. A Bahá’í is Killed in Iran, A Victim of Religious Hatred, BAHÁ’Í INT’L
COMMUNITY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.bic.org/news/bahai-killed-iran-victimreligious-hatred#ZCF5szcCQmbBCwsb.97.
2. Id.
3. Id. Bahá’ís have experienced repeated cycles of persecution since the
founding of the faith in the mid-nineteenth century. See IRAN HUM. RTS.
DOCUMENTATION CENTER, A FAITH DENIED: THE PERSECUTION OF BAHÁ’ÍS IN
IRAN
2
(2006),
http://www.iranhrdc.org/files.php?force&file=reports_en/A_Faith_Denied_Dec06_397039411.pdf.
3. Id. Due to the endemic social persecution they have experienced, Bahá’ís
must often approach seemingly innocent situations, like Mr. Amiri’s, with caution. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The Bahá’í International Community (BIC) registered as a nongovernmental organization in 1948 and represents the worldwide Bahá’í community,
whose members come from every national, ethnic, religious, cultural, and socio-economic background, representing a cross-section of humanity. See About
Us, BIC.ORG, https://www.bic.org/about/about-us#Gv8iMjH6lQG11tYi.99 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2017). It maintains U.N. offices in New York and Geneva, as
well as regional offices in Addis Ababa, Brussels, and Jakarta. Id. The BIC
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at the United Bations statedO “unfortunatelyO such a heinous act
is a consequence of a long-standing, systematic effort by Iranian
authorities to encourage hate and bigotry against Bahá’ísK”8
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated attack against the
Amiri family or the Bahá’í faith as a whole. Over the past few
years, the Bahá’ís in Yazd have been victims of wrongful arrests,
imprisonments, and raids on their residences and businesses.9
MrK Amiri’s children have also been targeted victims of persecution, as their businesses, laptops, telephones, and other items
were searched and confiscated by the government.10
The story of Mr. Amiri and his family is only one example of
the many atrocities committed against the Bahá’ís since the religion’s inceptionK Bahá’ís are not spared the rod of injustice in
any aspect of their lives. Not only are they killed, arbitrarily imprisoned, and tortured, but the government also utilizes systemic tactics against them, such as defacing and raiding their
personal property and sealing and burning their businesses.11
The government also prohibits their employment and denies
their access to higher education, thus isolating them from the
rest of Iranian society.12 Bahá’í children are also targets of the

views its work through the “framework of capacity building,” seeking the empowerment of larger segments of humanity to work for the spiritual and material betterment of all. Id. Focus areas include the realization of the equality of
women and men, youth as protagonists of constructive change, and the persecution of the Iranian Bahá’ís. Id.
8. A Bahá’í is Killed in Iran, A Victim of Religious Hatred, supra note 1.
9. Id. In November 2016, over one hundred Bahá’í owned businesses in
cities across Iran were sealed by Iranian authorities after they were closed to
observe Bahá’í holidays on the first two days of the month. See Forced Closure
of Shops in Iran On an Unprecedented Scale, BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY (Feb. 7,
2016),
https://www.bic.org/news/forced-closure-shops-iran-unprecedentedscale#2yJU46XG03UxsMrG.99. The BIC recently wrote a letter to the President of Iran, explaining that sealing Bahá’í businesses is one of many tactics
employed by Iranian authorities in their “economic apartheid” against the
Bahá’ís. Id. The BIC has called upon the international community to denounce
these “unjust actions and exhort the Iranian government to take immediate,
visible, and substantive measures to reverse the situation.” Id.
10. A Bahá’í is Killed in Iran, A Victim of Religious Hatred, supra note 1.
11. IRAN HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER, supra note 3, at 2.
12. The #NotACrime crime campaign was launched to draw attention to the
thousands of Bahá’ís that are barred from access to higher education through
the use of old school street art. See THE CAMPAIGN, http://www.notacrime.me/
(last visited Oct. 3, 2017); Human Rights in Iran, BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY
(Mar.
18,
2014),
https://www.bic.org/statements/human-rights-
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state’s oppressionO as they are imprisoned with their mothers
from infancy and ridiculed by teachers and school bullies.13 Media propaganda depicts the faith as a dangerous cult and incites
hatred and acts of violence against Bahá’ís.14
The Bahá’í religion originated in Persia (now Iran) in 1863,
when Bahá’u’lláh Q“Glory of God”P declared himself to be a
prophet of God.15 Bahá’í means follower of Bahá’u’lláhO whose
central teachings are: there is one God, that Divine Revelation
is progressive and all the Abrahamic faiths are of the same
origin, that people should work to eradicate all forms of prejudices, that there should be gender equality in all aspects of life,
that all races are equal, that universal education is essential,
and that each individual must independently investigate the
truth and develop good character.16 Because Baha’u’llah claimed
to be a Prophet of God after MuhammadO Iran’s fundamentalist
clergy brands Bahá’ís as heretics.17 Bahá’ís have traditionally
been persecuted on this basis.18
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979,19 more than 200 Bahá’ís
have been executed, hundreds more have been imprisoned and
iran#ffOpegcjeP16Dzmv.97. Some of the high-profile supporters of the campaign are Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Dr.
Shirin Ebadi. Id. The murals can be found in Harlem, South Africa, Rio De
Janeiro, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Sydney, London, Delhi, and Atlanta. Id.
13. Id.
14. Since the 1950s, high profile Shiite preachers have taken to the media
to disseminate their views regarding the falsehood of the Bahá’í faith. See IRAN
HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER, supra note 3, at 6. In 1955, Tehran Radio
broadcasted a series of anti-Bahá’í sermons by Iran’s leading preacher. Id. The
propaganda used during this period created negative stereotypes and incited
public outrage against Bahá’ís. Id. at 7.
15. See WENDI MOMEN & MOOJAN MOMEN, UNDERSTANDING THE BAHÁ’Í
FAITH xiii@ix (2006).
16. Id.
17. IRAN HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER, supra note 3, at 41.
18. Id.
19. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah’s authority was challenged by a growing number of factions in Iranian society, including religious conservatives led
by Ayatollah Khomeini. See id. at 2. Despite being forced into exile in 1964,
growing frustration with the Shah’s regime created an enormous following
around Khomeini’s vision of revitalizing Iran as an Islamic Republic and dismantling the Shah’s toxic western agenda. Id. Khomeini’s message led to a
revolution and the overthrow of the Shah. Id. The prominence of clerical rule
after the 1979 revolution gave rise to a centralized and government-directed
anti-Bahá’í campaign. Id. at 16. The new Islamic constitution explicitly withheld recognition as a religious minority from the Bahá’ís. Id. Instead, the
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tortured, and tens of thousands have been denied employment,
education, freedom of worship, and other rights.20 Many human
rights advocates have eSpressed “a fear of looming genocide”
against the Bahá’ís, but little has been done to alter their position.21 Since the Rwandan Genocide, leaders on the international
stage have vowed to take affirmative steps towards preventing
the occurrence of another mass genocide.22 The violent persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran reflects the continued unresponsiveness of international actors to conditions which resemble those
that have led to genocide in the past.23 The dearth of first responders to the plight of Bahá’ís in Iran could be addressed by a

Bahá’ís were categorized as a political threat, which was reinforced by propaganda that Bahá’ís were guilty of espionage or other anti-revolutionary criminal activity. Id.
20. BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, VIOLENCE WITHOUT IMPUNITY: ACTS OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST THE IRANIAN BAHÁ’Í COMMUNITY 1 (2013).
21. Reza Afashari, The Discourse and Practice of Human Rights Violations,
in THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF IRAN 232, 239 (Dominic Parviz Brookshaw & Seena B. Fazel
eds., 2008).
22. On the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide, U.N. Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon stated:
We have learned important lessons. We know more keenly
than ever that genocide is not a single event but a process
that evolves over time, and requires planning and resources
to carry out. As chilling as that sounds, it also means that
with adequate information, mobilization, courage and political will, genocide can be prevented.
Ban Ki-moon, Remarks at Launch of “Kwibuka20,” UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 27,
2014),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2014-02-27/remarkslaunch-kwibuka20.
23. See, e.g., Terry Glavin, Iran is Tormenting the Bahá’í People—Is Canada
Going to do anything about it, NATIONAL POST (Apr. 20, 2016), http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/terry-glavin-iran-is-tormenting-the-bahai-people-is-canada-going-to-do-anything-about-it. (“Canada has long shown leadership in shaming the regime about its contempt for human rights. Iran Accountability Week, during which MPs from all parties each 0adopt’ an Iranian political prisoner, is an annual event on Parliament Hill. Carleton University, the
University of Ottawa and McGill University each extend an informal accreditation to the 0underground’ Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education in Iran. Canada continues to lead in the United Nations’ annual scrutiny of Iran’s human
rights record. But with so many lucrative trade deals being dangled in front of
us, will Canadians persist in questioning the regime and holding it accountable
for its thuggish treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, women, trade unionists, journalists and secularists?”).
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more structural construction of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Qthe “Convention”PO which
makes genocide a crime under international law.24
As a religious group, the Bahá’í community is protected by the
Convention.25 While the Convention states that genocide can be
caused by the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated
to bring about a group’s physical destructionO this language is
restrictive, as it requires the intent to bring about the physical
destruction of the group per se.26 It has been shown that the systematic denial of economic resources to a group has led to more
death than physical annihilation.27 An early draft of the Convention noted that there was only a “difference of degree” between
condemning people to death by depriving them of the means of
livelihood and a quick death in a concentration camp.28 In determining the culpability of Iran’s leadershipO it should no longer
be necessary to show that the current regime has an explicit plan
to cause physical harm to the Bahá’í community. Instead, it
should be required to show that there are structural devices in
place that could foreseeably lead to its dissolution.29

24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Article
II of the Convention defines the crime of genocide as follows:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Id. art. II.
25. Paul D. Allen, The Bahá’ís of Iran: A Proposal for Enforcement of International Human Rights Standards, 20 CORNELL INT’L .J. 337, 345 (1987).
26. Thomas W. Simon, Defining Genocide, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 252 (1996).
27. Id. at 249.
28. WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES 189 (2000).
29. Simon, supra note 26, at 248.
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The international women’s rights movement provides a strong
example of how an area of international law developed to encompass systematic harms.30 One way of defining genocide more expansively to capture systemic harms may be to apply the human
capabilities approach, which was developed by Amartya Sen and
greatly expounded upon by Martha Nussbaum.31 The human capabilities approach provides a framework for looking at life
based on the capacity that individuals have to access what is
considered necessary to survive.32 Under this theory, human beings who do not have access to certain fundamental capabilities,
such as the ability to bury their dead or educate their young,
may be considered deprived of things that are fundamental to
life, and at certain extremes, deprived of life itself.33
This Bote will eSamine the implications of the Convention’s
limited and flawed definition, as well as how a broader and more
structural definition could resolve the crisis facing the Bahá’í
community in Iran. Part I will describe structural oppression of
Bahá’ís in Iran, beginning from the retaliatory violence that occurred in the earliest years of the religion to the contours structural devices used by the current regime to completely suppress
the progress of the Bahá’ís within Iranian society. Part II will
explore the development of the Convention and debate surrounding its definition, highlighting a trend in arguments made
for a more structural approach. Part III will then describe the
evolution of the substantive approach to human rights that
emerged from the international women’s rights movementO as
well as the human capabilities approach to rights. Finally, Part
IV will suggest that the Convention be amended to include a
two-prong definition of genocide, which allows for the prosecution of state structures designed to completely incapacitate targeted groups.
I. THE SYSTEMIC OPPRESSION OF BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN
For more than three decades, the Iranian government has
“waged widespread and systematic campaigns” against the
30. See Dianne Otto, Women’s Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
496 (Moeckli et al. eds., 2014).
31. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). See also
Martha Nussbaum, Women and Equality: The Capabilities Approach, 138
INT’L LAB. REV., 227@46 (1999) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Women and Equality].
32. Id. at 234.
33. Id.
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Bahá’í community.34 The persecution of the Bahá’í community
by the current regime is the result of “historical efforts by fundamentalist clergy to devalue and persecute” Bahá’ís.35 Islamic
fundamentalists in Iran believe that Bahá’ís are heretics because of the faith’s claim to be a new and independent religion.36
One of the central teachings of the Bahá’í faith is “progressive
revelationO” which is the belief that each of the world’s religions
represents an evolution in God’s message to mankindK37 The declaration of the Báb38 as the “Fidden Imam” is particularly offenL
sive to Shi’itesO contributing greatly to the public perception of
Bahá’ís as heretics.39 The equality of men and women, as well as
the elimination of institutional clergy, also conflict with some of
the more conservative interpretations of Islam that Shi’i fundaL
mentalists fervently uphold.40
Within decades of its founding, at least 4,000 Bahá’ís?known
then as Bábís?were killed.41 Violence against Bahá’ís continued
until the early part of the twentieth century, with episodes such
as a cycle of killing and looting that persisted for a month in the
city of Yazd, as well as an incident in 1903, where seventy
Bahá’ís were murdered by mobs.42 After the Constitutional Revolution (1905@1906), the increasingly centralized state of the
Reza Shah gave Bahá’ís more security, which allowed them to
build and operate dozens of schools and earn a reputation as a
34. BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, supra note 20, at 1.
35. Friedrich W. Affolter, The Specter of Ideological Genocide: The Bahá’ís
of Iran, 1 WAR CRIMES GENOCIDE & CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN 75, 79 (2005).
36. Muslims believe that Muhammad is the final prophet and Islam the final religion. BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, supra note 20, at 31.
37. Bahá’ís believe that Abraham, Krishna, Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad were all divine messengers. See The Bahá’í Faith and
Other Religions, BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, http://www.bahai.org/dir/other_religions (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
38. The precursor to the Bahá’í faith, the Bábí faith, began in 1844, when
Seyyed 0Ali Muhammad proclaimed that he was “The Báb” [the Gate], the personification of the “Hidden Imam,” whose return has been awaited by Shi’i
Muslims since the ninth century. See IRAN HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER,
supra note 3, at 3. The Báb also foretold that his appearance signaled the advent of another prophet, whose teachings would establish unity, peace, and
order on earth. Id.
39. Denis MacEoin, The Bahá’ís of Iran: The Roots of Controversy, 14
BRITISH SOC’Y MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. BULL. 75, 77 (1987).
40. BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, supra note 20, at 31.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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progressive force within society.43 Even during this relatively
tolerant period, however, Bahá’ís continued to be victims of attacks, which served as reminders of their marginalized status
and illegitimacy.44
Despite experiencing intense violence and persecution
throughout the years, the religion steadily expanded from
100,000 followers in the late 1800s to an estimated 300,000 by
the mid-1900s.45 Since the growth of the Bahá’í community is
what fundamentalist clerics in Iran ultimately feared, it is little
surprise that attacks against the Bahá’ís surged during the Islamic Revolution.46 The Revolution marked the genesis of the
broad outlines of the modern systemic and state sanctioned violence against the Bahá’í community that continues today.47 Between 1979 and 1988, more than a thousand Bahá’ís were imprisoned, while tens of thousands lost jobs, pensions, and were
deprived of education.48 In the 1990s, the most egregious forms
of persecution ebbed, this time in response to international pressure.49 During this quiet period, however, a high-level govern-

43. Id.
44. In 1944, 4,000 people looted and destroyed a Bahá’í Center in Abadih.
Id. In 1955, a prominent Islamic clergyman labeled the Bahá’í faith as a “false
religion” and attacked them on his radio program during the month of Ramadan, inciting a series of widespread attacks on Bahá’ís and their property and
holy places. Id. The bodies of Bahá’ís were also mutilated and disinterred from
gravesites. Id.
45. Id. at 32, 36 (“History has shown that the only real protection for Iranian
Bahá’ís comes from continued international outcry and action. The last three
decades have proved that Iranian authorities are indeed cognizant of international opinion and that pressure to meet their obligations under international
human rights law can have an effect.”).
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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ment memorandum was released to address the “Bahá’í questionO”50 in which the government made its intent to block the progress and development of the Bahá’í community clear.51
In the 2000s, there was a surge in the harassment of Bahá’ís
that reflected the reassertion of fundamentalist values by the
regime.52 One of the most alarming developments was the arrest
of seven Bahá’ís leaders in 2008.53 This was ominously reminiscent of the disappearance of nine Bahá’í leaders in 1981, whom
disappeared without a trace and are presumed dead.54 The arrested Bahá’í leaders have been =ailed in Iran’s Evin Prison since
2008, solely for being members of the Bahá’í faith.55 The stories
50. The memorandum, which was drafted by the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution and approved by then President Khamenei, has been more
influential than any codified statute or regulation on the issue. Shahin Milani,
The Situation of the Bahá’í Minority in Iran and the Existing Legal Framework,
COLUMBIA SIPA J. INT’L AFF. (June 6, 2016), https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/situation-bahai-minority-iran-existing-legal-framework. It states that Bahá’ís
should be barred from entering universities, denied employment, and prevented from reaching positions of influence. Id. The “Bahá’í question,” however, first became politicized in 1955, when Seyyed Ahmad Safa’i, a member of
the Iranian parliament, introduced a bill which offered a four-part solution to
the “problem.” Id. The bill declared that being a member of the Bahá’í faith
constituted a misdemeanor and that any “perpetrator” would be subject to solitary confinement for two to ten years and be deprived of all civil rights. IRAN
HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER, supra note 3, at 10 (citing SHAHROUGH
AKHAVI, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN: CLERGY-STATE
RELATIONS IN THE PAHLAVI PERIOD 80@83 (1980)).
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id. at 2.
53. In 2010, the seven Bahá’í leaders were each sentenced to twenty years
in prison. See Bahá’í World News Service, Profiles of the Seven Bahá’í “Leaders,”
BAHÁ’Í
WORLD
NEWS
SERV.,
http://news.bahai.org/humanrights/iran/yaran-special-report/profiles (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). In addition to the national security charges that Bahá’ís are typically charged with,
they were also charged with espionage against the state, with their appeals
ultimately being rejected. Milani, supra note 50. All seven were sentenced to
twenty years in prison after being held incommunicado for weeks and not allowed to access legal counsel for over a year. Id. All seven currently remain in
Iran’s Evin Prison. Id.
54. BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION: A CULTURAL CLEANSING
IN IRAN 13 (Sept. 2008), https://www.bic.org/sites/default/files/pdf/TheBahaiQuestion.pdf.
55. In a report published by Frontline, Evin Prison is described as “every
Iranian’s worst nightmare.” Inside Iran: Tehran’s Most Notorious Evin Prison,
AL ARABIYA (June 14, 2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2015/06/14/Inside-Iran-Tehran-s-notorious-Evin-Prison.html; Michael

370

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 43:1

of these leaders and their families demonstrate the multi-generational impact of persecution and the cyclical pattern of statesponsored persecution.56 Beyond imprisonment, the Iranian gov-

Theodoulou, In Iran’s Evin Prison, Fear Stalks the Corridors, NATIONAL (Feb.
27, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/in-irans-evinprison-fear-stalks-the-corridors#page2. The prison has been nicknamed “Evin
University,” due to the large number of intellectuals, political prisoners, journalists, and academics that have been incarcerated there. Id. It has a common
reputation for grossly abusing prisoners, with prison guards “beating prisoners, dragging them across the floor and verbally insulting them.” Id. Most prisoners in Evin are held in solitary confinement and most of the cells contain
neither a toilet nor bed. See D. Parvaz, 16 Days in Evin Prison, FRONTLINE:
TEHRAN BUREAU (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/01/notebook-16-days-in-evin-prison.html. Lights within the
facility are left on for twenty-four hours a day so that prisoners have difficulty
sleeping. Id. Moreover, whenever prisoners leave their cell, they are blindfolded. Id. Former inmates describe harsh interrogation tactics, as well as denial of phone calls, family visits, and access to legal counsel. Id.
56. Jamaloddin Khanjani is an eighty-one-year-old man and one of the
seven Bahá’í leaders who has been imprisoned in Evin. See Bahá’í International Community, Honoring Jamaloddin Khanjani: Day Three of the #7Bahais7years Campaign, BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY (May 16, 2015),
https://www.bic.org/news/honoring-jamaloddin-khanjani-day-three-7bahais7years-campaign#5SxJP6aABAIE4EXw.97. Mr. Khanjani is one of seven
Bahá’ís arrested between May 2008@2009. Id. All seven of the Bahá’ís were
visible and active members of the Bahá’í, who were known for their service
within the community, as well as Iranian society. Id. Mr. Khanjani was born
in 1933 in the city of Sangsar, where he grew up on a dairy farm and never
received more than a high school education. Id. Mr. Khanjani, however, defied
the odds and became the successful owner of a brick factory, only to lose his
entire livelihood in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, solely for being
a Bahá’í. Id. Before his current incarceration, Mr. Khanjani was arrested and
jailed by the Iranian government at least three different times, each time solely
for being a Bahá’í. Id. In 2011, when his wife of fifty years passed away, Mr.
Khanjani was denied leave from prison to be by her side during her final days
of life. Id. He was even denied leave to attend her funeral. Id. Other members
of his family have experienced severe persecution, including his son, nephew,
granddaughter, grandson, and grandnephew. Id.
56. Paul D. Allen, supra note 25, at 340. In 2011, his brother was attacked
twice in one month by unknown individuals who threw firebombs into his window. See Baha’i International Community, supra note 55. In 2014, his son was
arrested, along with four other Bahá’ís, in a raid on an optical shop in Semnan
where he was employed. Id. The story of Mr. Khanjani and his family is not
exceptional, but rather the common experience of many Bahá’í families in Iran.
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ernment denies Bahá’ís jobs, pensions, education, and the freedom to marry.57 Bahá’ís have no rights or protections under the
1979 Iranian Constitution, as they are not considered citizens.58
Recently, the Iranian government has intensified its use of economic persecution to further suppress the Bahá’í community. In
June 2016, the Iranian government shut down twenty-seven
stores in the city of Ormieh and six stores in Sanandaj, all of
which were owned by the Bahá’í.59 This was not an isolated occurrence, but rather, only the most recent example of what has
been a growing trend since the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani.60 In the last two years, hundreds of shops belonging to Bahá’ís were shut down by the Iranian authorities because
they were closed on Bahá’í Holy Days.61 The “economic stranguL
lation” of Bahá’ís in Iran is not a recent phenomenon. Instead, it
is one of the many state-sanctioned tactics that has been used
since the Revolution to exclude Bahá’ís from social and economic
life.62 Owning a small business has become the only option for
many Bahá’ís, and now the closure of these stores seems to be
the final step in a series of persecutions.63
After over 150 years, the recent flux of economic persecution is
but one of many mechanisms that has been used to suppress the
Bahá’ís. In an interview given shortly before his return to Iran
in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini was asked about the position of religious minorities in the future of the Islamic Republic, to which
he repliedO “they are a political faction% they are harmful% they
will not be acceptedK”64 Since then, evidence has been found of
57. Paul D. Allen, supra note 25, at 340.
58. Id.
59. Bahá’í International Community, End Economic Discrimination in Iran
(June 22, 2016) BAHÁ’Í INT’L COMMUNITY, https://www.bic.org/statements/endeconomic-discrimination-iran#DB78MbmF9cw1rZhv.97.
60. Id.
61. The Iranian government has justified its actions by stating that the closure of businesses on holy days was a violation of the law and a disruption to
the market. Id.
62. Since the inception of the Islamic Revolution, Bahá’ís have not been able
to work in the public sector, as asagents from the Ministry of Information pressure their employers to dismiss them. Id. Further, factories and businesses
have been shut down or confiscated, while farmlands belonging to Bahá’ís have
been appropriated. Id.
63. Id.
64. Denis MacEoin, supra note 39, at 75; See also Abbas Amanat, The Historical Roots of the Persecution of Bahá’ís in Iran, in THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF IRAN 170
(Dominic Parviz Brookshaw and Seena B. Fazel eds., 2008).
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the current regime’s agendaO which is intended to suppress the
“progress and development” of the Bahá’í community.65 The history of the religion’s persecutionO taken together with the reL
gime’s current schemeO lays bare a sophisticated and multi-faceted process to destroy the Bahá’í community that is tantamount
to genocide.66
II. THE CONTROVERSIAL DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE AND THE
PUSH FOR CHANGE
This Part will examine the historical development of the definition of genocide by detailing its implementation into the Convention. It will then discuss the debate surrounding its narrow
definition under Article II of the Convention by comparing it to
the broader definition of crimes against humanity. Finally, this
Part will present arguments posed by scholars and jurists for a
more structural approach to the definition of genocide.
A. The Convention: History and Evolution
The Convention is one of the most widely accepted international instruments.67 It has widely been recognized that a crime

65. Memorandum from Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani (Feb. 25, 1991),
https://www.bic.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ran/1991%20Bahai%20Question%20Memo%20ENG.pdf.
66. In 1983, the New York Times published an article with the headline,
“Iran’s Bahá’ís: Some Call it Genocide” after twenty Bahá’ís were condemned
to death. R.W. Apple Jr., Iran’s B_B,’W': Some Call it Genocide, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/27/weekinreview/iran-sbaha-is-some-call-it-genocide.html. Other reports have been published by various human rights groups exposing the threat of genocide to the Bahá’í community, including a 2010 report, which emphasized the volatility of the situation and how it could take one “trigger event” for a genocide against the Bahá’ís
to occur. SENTINEL PROJECT FOR GENOCIDE PREVENTION, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT: THE THREAT OF GENOCIDE TO BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN 7 (Sept. 20, 2010),
https://thesentinelproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Supplementary-Report-Bahais-of-Iran-2010.pdf.
67. The development of genocide as a crime is rooted in the history of international criminal law and the post-World War II efforts to prosecute Nazis in
the wake of the Holocaust. See Robin Cryer, International Criminal Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 498 (Moeckli et al. eds. 2014). The Convention occupies “a prominent place among post-war efforts” by “transcending the
states focused nature of international law” and identifying genocide as an “odious scourge” that “has inflicted great losses on humanity.” Id. In 1946, the
United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 96(I), stated that:
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of genocide is part of customary international law.68 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)69 has asserted that the prohibition of genocide is a norm that has reached jus cogens status.70
In 1948, the drafting of the Convention was completed, with Article I confirming that genocide is a crime under international
law and Article II defining the crime of genocide.71 The designation of jus cogens means that the principles underlying the Convention are binding on states.72 The criminal prosecution of genocide begins with the recognition that persecution of ethnic, nationalO or religious minorities is not only “morally outrageousO
but might incur legal liabilityK”73
The post-1948 history of the Convention has shown mixed results.74 Decades of inaction has led the Convention to serve as a
“symbolic reminder of the international community’s promL
isesK”75 One reason for this may be because accusations of genocide are “colored by the paradigm case still very much within our

Genocide is the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, . . . such denial of the right of existence shocks
the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. . . . The
General Assembly, therefore affirms that genocide is a crime
under international law.
Id.
68. Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge
to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 229@30 (1995).
69. The ICJ is the principal organ of the United Nations. Jane Connors &
Markus Schmit, United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 395
(Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2013). Its role is to settle legal disputes submitted
by states and provide advisory opinions on legal questions referred by other
U.N. organs and specialized agencies. Id. Individuals cannot bring cases to the
ICJ. Id.
70. See Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(New Application: 2002) (DRC v. Rwanda), 2006, I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 64 (Feb. 23).
71. Id.; Genocide Convention, supra note 24.
72. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. Rep 15, 23.
73. SCHABAS, supra note 28, at 17.
74. Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for
a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV 2259, 2260 (1999).
75. Id. at 2264; See also Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 230 (1995). (“The
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living memory” and that the term genocide itself was born out of
the Holocaust.76 Due to the strong correlation between the term
genocide and the Holocaust, there is a tendency to compare injuries to groups protected by the Convention to the atrocities inflicted upon the Jewish people during the Holocaust.77 As such,
perpetrators of genocidal acts evade harm by not falling within
the “genocidal rubricK”78 This has led to an often contentious debate surrounding the definition of genocide used within the Convention.
B. The Debate Surrounding the Definition of Genocide
Since the adoption of the Convention, there has been debate
surrounding the definition of genocide.79 The Convention sets
out a narrow definition of the crime that is limited, in large part,
to the physical destruction or extermination of a group.80 Scholars have often compared the language within the Convention to
the broader definition of crimes against humanity, which extends to various forms of persecution that involve “the intenL
tional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivityK”81 In spite of calls for a revised definition, the language
within the Convention remains narrow, while the definition of
what constitutes a crime against humanity has broadened to address a range of atrocities against both groups and individuals.82
Over the years, the development of case law has reflected a

failure to prevent and punish genocide betrays a lack of political will to confront effectively the intentional mass destruction of entire human groups. The
lack of political will, in turn, betrays a cynical and short-sighted policy on the
part of world leaders that fails to comprehend the immense moral and political
consequences of inaction against such gross abuses of power.”).
76. Hugo Adam Bedau, Genocide in Vietnam, 53 B.U. L. REV. 574, 577
(1973).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. William A. Schabas, Genocide Law in a Time of Transition: Recent Developments in the Law of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 161 (2008).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 was the “ideal forum” for developments in the definition of genocide as a response to the many proposals
that had been made over the years. Id. at 162. Cuba, however, was the only
country to suggest a change to the definition. Id.

2017]

B_B,’W' NF/.JAHF

375

sharp distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity, where the latter encompasses persecution that falls short of
physical destruction and applies to national, ethnic, racial, and
religious groups, as well as a broader range of victim groups not
contemplated by the Convention.83 Another way in which crimes
against humanity are defined more broadly than genocide is
through the mens rea element.84 In order for an actor to meet the
bar for the mens rea requirement under Article II, he/she must
intend to destroy the group.85 An actor who commits a crime
against humanityO howeverO “selects victims because of their
group membershipK”86 The hazy line between the two makes it
difficult to distinguish between persecution against members of
a group because of their membership and inflicting harm upon a
group with intent of destructing it in its entirety.87
The scholarly debate surrounding the definition of genocide is
predominantly divided between two camps: restrictivists and expansionists.88 Restrictivists follow a strict interpretation of the
Convention and expansionists advocate for a broader understanding of genocide.89 The debate between these two groups is
tied to a larger debate in the human rights field between universalists and relativists.90 Universalists argue that human rights
derive power from their ability to transcend local, national, and
international laws, both geographically and temporally.91 Relativists, however, argue that human rights should not be imposed
uniformly across cultures.92 Restrictivists adhere to the interpretive approach employed by universalists and expansionists
view human rights more generally, similar to relativists.93 The
83. Id. at 192.
84. JOHN QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANALYSIS 12 (2013).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Tatiana E. Sainati, Toward a Comparative Approach to Genocide,
62 DUKE L. J. 161, 165 (2012).
89. Id.; See also Michael J. Kelly, “Genocide”—The Power of a Label, 40 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 147, 157 (2008) (“Restrictivists seek to restrain the label’s
usage to atrocities more akin to the Holocaust, while expansionists seek to
broaden the labels usage to include tangential atrocities.”).
90. Id. at 166.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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dichotomy between the restrictivist and expansionist approach
is harmful, not only within debate about the Convention, but the
broader framework of international human rights law.94 For example, an expansionist approach may put judicial bodies in a
position where they are redefining the law to “fit idiosyncratic
social needsK”95 Alternatively, taking a restrictivist approach will
mandate a uniform application of the law across cultures96 that
will have the impact of constraining courts to a strict interpretation of the law’s teStK”97
The Convention’s intent prong has also been a source of conL
tention. It has been referred to as the Convention’s “achilles
heel” because of the ambiguity associated with proving itK98 The
introductory paragraph of Article II of the Convention states
that acts must be committed with the “intent to destroy in whole
or in partK”99 The most ubiquitous definition of genocide requires
that “the perpetrator select victims on the basis of their group
identity and must desire the destruction of the groupK”100 The
tension between the restrictivist and expansionist approach can
also be found within the analysis of the intent prong.101 The debate surrounding the intent prong, however, is also where the
argument for a more structuralist approach to genocide is taking
shape. The focus of scholars who take a more structural approach to genocide “turns from the individual to the structural
elements that give rise to genocide and other mass atrocitiesK”102
In order for an individual to be charged with the crime of genocide, he/she must have the requisite mens rea, requiring him or
94. Id. at 169.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Ryan Park, Proving Genocidal Intent: International Precedent and
ECCC Case 002, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 129, 137 (2010).
98. John Quigley, A Useful Legal Category, 19 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 115,
117 (2009) (“Could it be through statements that accompany acts of violence,
statements that might bespeak an aim to destroy the group? Or might such an
intent be deduced from the very acts of violence?”).
99. Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 2.
100. Greenawalt, supra note 74, at 2294.
101. See Schabas, supra note 79, 163 (2008) (“The limited scope of the Genocide Convention definition has led many academics and human rights activists
in two distinct directions. There have been frequent attempts to stretch the
Genocide Convention definition, often going beyond all reason, in order to fit
particular atrocities within the meaning of Article II. Other commentators
have also proposed new definitions to enlarge the scope of the term.”).
102. THOMAS W. SIMON, THE LAW OF GENOCIDE 71 (2007).
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her to have a direct connection with the criminal act.103 Those
who argue for a more structural approach to genocide contend
that genocide is a “less directO more meditated connection to a
criminal actK”104 The mens rea for genocide also includes a
knowledge-based test, which requires defendants to have the
requisite intent or knowledge of the alleged crime.105 Proponents
of a more structural approach to intent argue that a court should
eSamine how the individual functioned within the organiRation’s
structure.106 Advocates of the structural approach hone in on the
systemic foundations of genocide and for alterations within the
systems that produce genocide.107 At the heart of the argument
for a more structural definition of intent is that in “a bureauL
cratic world dominated by anonymous forces, it becomes increasingly difficult to locate intentional actorsK”108 Structuralists argue that the inherent difficulty of detecting specific agents of
genocide should not create an impossible standard for meeting
the intent prong of Article II.109
Another barrier to prosecuting genocide is that the perpetrator
defines the victim’s status as a member of a group protected by
the Convention.110 Victim groups, however, are defined not only
by state actors, but by the structures put into place to identify
who belongs to the targeted group.111 For example, Nazis developed a system to delineate between who was considered to be a

103. Id.; see also Greenawalt, supra note 74, at 2294 (“With its use of the
word “intent,” the Genocide Convention appeals to a central concept of criminal
culpability. The problem is that the historical understanding of criminal intent
has eluded uniform understanding. According to the traditional common-law
doctrine, criminal perpetrators intended the consequences of their actions if
they knew to a practical certainty what the consequences of those actions
would be, regardless of whether or not they deliberately sought to realize those
consequences. At the same time, however, common law jurisdictions have also
employed an alternate model of intent-based liability. In the case of so-called
“specific intent” crimes, liability attaches only to perpetrators whose actual
aim or purpose is to realize certain forbidden consequences.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Simon, supra note 26, at 249.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Schabas, supra note 79, at 164.
111. Simon, supra note 102, at 250 (“Acts of genocide do not occur randomly,
accidently, or indiscriminately. The perpetrator identifies the targeted group
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Jewish and non-Jewish person during the Holocaust.112 The Iranian government utilizes the education system to identify other
Bahá’ís.113 The Ministry of Justice states that Bahá’ís are only
permitted to sit for a university entrance examination and enroll
in institutions of higher education if they do not formally identify as Bahá’ís.114 In order for states to be held accountable for
genocidal acts, it is crucial for links to be drawn between individuals and the state, as opposed to narrowly focusing on the
intent of individuals.115
Advocates for a more structural definition under the intent
prong also envision less distinction between the physical and
nonphysical harm.116 In Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judge Shahabuddeen of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated:
A group is constituted by characteristics?often intangible?
binding together a collection of people as a social unit. If those
characteristics have been destroyed in pursuance of the intent
with which a listed act of a physical or biological nature was
done, it is not convincing to say that the destruction, though
effectively obliterating the group, is not genocide because the
obliteration was not physical or biological. 117

Judge Shahabuddeen goes on to state that while intent to destroy should be required for culpability, destruction need not be
defined narrowly to be solely physical or biological.118 He asserts
that the destruction of culture “may serve evidentially to confirm
an intentO” pointing to the destruction of holy places as an eSamL
ple.119 Eudge Shahabuddeen’s views regarding allowing cultural
forms of destruction to be used in order to establish the mens rea
in some way, however perverse, generally through accompanying state structures, such as laws, and then fully employs the state apparatus to eliminate
members of the group.”).
112. Id.
113. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
LABOR, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 2013: IRAN 5 (July 28,
2014), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 50 (Apr. 19, 2004) (partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
117. Id.
118. Id. ¶ 51.
119. Id. ¶ 53 (“[T]he razing of the principal mosque confirms an intent to destroy the Srebrenica part of the Bosnian Muslim Group.”).

2017]

B_B,’W' NF/.JAHF

379

element of the intent prong were adopted by several trial chambers.120 Furthermore, judicial bodies that have adopted Judge
Shahabuddeen’s standard have employed a more nuanced defiL
nition of physical or biological destruction that “enlarges the definition of intent to include borderline cases where there are
abundant examples of ethnic hatred but an absence of evidence
that physical destruction occurredK”121 The impact of Judge Shahabuddeen’s opinion on lower courts demonstrates a shift towards a more structural application of the Convention. While
Judge Shahabuddeen utilized the bench to espouse his point of
view regarding the Convention’s limitationsO a stronger antidote
for the Convention’s limitations would be to amend it to be a
more robust instrument.
III. SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE HUMAN CAPABILITIES
APPROACH
This Part will explore substantive approaches within the
realm of international human rights law. It will begin by examining the enactment of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)?which was
the result of an organized effort by feminists within the human
rights community. It will then look to the human capabilities
approach as a framework for enforcing a more structural defini-

120. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶
659@60 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006) (“0Destruction,’ as a component of the mens rea of
genocide, is not limited to physical or biological destruction of the group’s members, since the group (or a part of it) can be destroyed in other ways, such as
by transferring children out of the group (or the part) or by severing the bonds
among its members.”).
121. In Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, the court included a footnote that expands
upon the intent requirement for physical or biological genocide, stating that
while members of a group are:
[P]hysical or biological beings . . . bonds among its members,
as well as cultural beliefs, are neither physical nor biological.
FenceO the Genocide Convention’s 0intent to destroy’ the
group cannot sensibly be regarded as reducible to an intent
to destroy the group both physically or biologically, as has occasionally been said.
SCHABAS, supra note 28, at 61.
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tion of rights. Finally, this Part will suggest applying the framework of CEDAW and the human capabilities theory to create a
definition of genocide that not only takes a more systemic approach to describing harms, but also allows for the Convention
to serve both penal and preventative purposes.
A. CEDAW: A More Robust Definition of Rights for Women
Increased dissatisfaction with the marginalization of women122
within the framework of the implementation of international human rights law led to the creation of CEDAW.123 While not disparate in its approach, CEDAW distinguishes itself from the International Covenant on Civil and Human Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), which provide guidelines for how states can
treat both individuals and groups under international law124 by
focusing specifically on nondiscrimination.125 Among the omissions within the ICCPR and ICESCR were that the terms
“e'uality” and “discrimination” were not definedO which led to
some states having minimum human rights safeguards in place
for women.126 One of the strategies employed by CEDAW in promoting a more comprehensive understanding of women’s e'ualL
ity was the adoption of a comprehensive definition of what it
meant to discriminate against women.127 The definition covers a
122. Otto, supra note 30, at 322.
123. Id.
124. After World War II, the primary means for establishing women’s equality was adopted by the drafter of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(UDHR) through “prohibiting discrimination based on sex in the enjoyment of
universal rights and freedoms which, notably, does not single women out as
the disadvantaged gender group.” Id. at 319@20. When the UDHR became a
legally binding instrument, the ICESCR and the ICCPR also mirrored its language. Id.
125. Id. at 322.
126. Id. at 320
127. In Article I of CEDAW:
[D]iscrimination against women is defined to mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women,
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, cultural, civil or any other field.
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wide range of conduct, such as direct and indirect discrimination
and unintended and intended discrimination.128 Moreover, it
promotes substantive equality by requiring that women be able
to “en=oy” or “eSercise” their human rights and fundamental
freedoms, making it clear that the prohibition of discrimination
against women applies to all realms of life, not just the public
sphere.129 The CEDAW committee monitors the Convention’s
implementation and works to clarify many of the other obligations required by its substantive approaches, through urging
states to take a gender-inclusive approach to addressing different issues that fundamentally influence both women and men.130
Substantive equality goes beyond a notion of formal, or de jure,
equality.131 Instead, substantive equality focuses on eliminating
individual, institutional, and systemic discrimination against
disadvantaged groups that inhibits their “full and e'ual social,
economicO politicalO and cultural participation in societyK”132
From a substantive equality point of view, treating people
equally does not mean treating them the same.133 Based on the
discrimination a group has faced, along with existing discriminatory attitudes, a law that facially puts two groups, such as
men and women, on par with each other does not necessarily
treat them equally under the substantive equality model.134
Thus, a substantive approach to equality embraces that discrimination must be addressed systematically in order to account for
the disparities in privilege held by groups throughout a society.135 In order to do this, substantive equality requires that
states take additional measures to account for the reality that
groups are differently situated across society.136

Id. at 323.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. For example, the CEDAW committee urges states to adopt criteria in
the determination of equal pay that address the distinctive features and factors
that differ for women in comparison to men. Id.
131. Jennifer S. Hainsfurther, A Rights-Based Approach: Using CEDAW to
Protect the Human Rights of Migrant Workers, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 843, 862
(2009).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 865.
136. Id.
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B. The Human Capabilities Theory and Rights
Aligned with the substantive definition of women’s rights beL
hind CEDAW, the human capabilities approach was born out of
the scholarship of Amartya Sen.137 Although it mainly applies in
an economic context, Martha Nussbaum has pioneered its application within the domain of women’s rightsK138 The idea behind
the capabilities approach is that there are “certain functions
that are particularly central to human life, in the sense that
their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of
the presence of absence of human lifeK”139 The human capabilities approach has been used to answer certain questions, such
as: What is the living standard? What is the quality of life?140
Nussbaum suggests that the absence of a capability can be
judged as so central to the functioning of a human that without
it the person is not really a human being at all.141 Furthermore,
the level at which a human’s capability is truly human is when
it is worthy of the human being.142 At the heart of the approach
is that each person is a bearer of value.143 This combats the fact
that behind all exploitation is the objectification of human beings for the use of others.144 Nussbaum provides the following
list145 as central human functional capabilities: life, bodily
137. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87 (2001) (“There is a strong
case for judging individual advantage in terms of the capabilities that a person
has, that is the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life
he or she has reason to value. In this perspective, poverty must be seen as a
deprivation of basic capabilities rather than a lowness of incomes, which is the
standard criterion of identification of poverty.”).
138. See generally Nussbaum, supra note 31, at 227@46; Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV., 273@300 (1997)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Capabilities].
139. See Nussbaum, Women and Equality, supra note 31, at 234 (“The core
idea [of the human capabilities approach] is that of the human being is a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life, rather than being passively
shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a flock or herd animal.”).
140. Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 138, at 279.
141. Id. at 282.
142. Id. at 279.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 286.
145. The list is the result of years of cross-cultural discussions and is designed so that its items can be more concretely applied to local beliefs and circumstances. Id. at 277. In describing the methodology that went toward compiling the list, Nussbaum states:
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health, imagination and thought, emotion, practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other species, play, and control over
one’s environmentK146
Each item on Bussbaum’s list is of e'ual importance and is
related to one another in “compleS waysK”147 Among the capabilities, however, Nussbaum designates practical reason and affiliation148 as being particularly significant.149 The capabilities approach begins with the moral claim that human beings, with the
right education and material support, are able to perform the
functions in question.150 Nussbaum highlights that for women,
and for all humans, a life without dignity and choice is a death
to one’s humanityK151 CapabilitiesO under Bussbaum’s viewO have
a very close relationship to human rightsO in that “they effect the
terrain between so-called first generation rights (political and
civil liberties) and the so-called second-generation rights (economic and social rightsPK”152
Fuman rights and capabilities are similar in that they “proL
vide the philosophical underpinning for basic constitutional
The list is an attempt to summarize the empirical findings of
a broad and ongoing cross-cultural inquiry. As such, it is
open-ended and humble; it can always be contested and remadeK It does not claim to read facts of 0human nature’ off of
biological observation, although it does of course take account
of biology as a relatively constant element in human experience. Nor does it deny that the items on the list are to some
extent differently constructed by different societies. Indeed,
part of the idea of the list is that its members can be more
concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances.
Id. at 286.
146. Id. at 287.
147. Nussbaum, Women and Equality, supra note 31, at 236.
148. “Affiliation” is defined as “having the social bases of self-respect and
non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is
equal to that of others. This entails protections against discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national
origin.” Id. at 235. Practical reason is defined as “being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s
life (which entails protection for the liberty of conscience).” Id.
149. Id. at 236.
150. Id. at 239.
151. Id. at 237.
152. Id. at 239.
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principlesK”153 Nussbaum, however, suggests that certain rights,
such as the right to religious exercise and speech, should be
looked at as capabilities.154 In doing this, the issue of countries
having “rights” documented on paperO while not effectively apL
plying or protecting them, can be avoided by critiquing the existence or non-existence of rights by whether people have the capability to function within that area.155 Nussbaum views human
capability as a means of providing a new conceptual framework
for what it means to define human rights that goes beyond a
mere nominal presentation of what a group or individuals rights
are.156 One further advantage of taking a capabilities approach
verses a rights approach is that the term “rights” is associated
with the European Enlightenment and Western thought, while
capabilities are much more universal and are not linked to one
cultural or historical tradition.157 There are also complex theoretical questions surrounding rights, such as whether the individual is the only bearer of rights, or whether rights belong to
other entities, such as families, religious, ethnic, and linguistic
groups.158
The enactment of CEDAW demonstrates that when rights are
defined more comprehensively, they provide greater protections
to the individuals they are designed to protect. Correspondingly,
Bussbaum’s approach to human capabilities serves as a reL
minder that rights, specifically the right to life, cannot just be
nominally defined and cosmetically applied. Rather, in order to
153. Id. at 240.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 241. (“So 0rights’ are not exclusively Western, in the sense that
matters most; they can be endorsed from a variety of perspectives. None the
less, the language of capabilities enables us to bypass this troublesome debate.
When we speak simply to what people can do and be, we do not even speak of
what people are actually able to do and to be, we do not even give the appearance of privileging a Western idea. Ideas of activity and ability are everywhere,
and there is no culture in which people do not ask themselves what they are
able to do, what opportunities they have for functioning.”).
158. Nussbaum further asserts that the language of rights “to some extent
cuts across this debate and obscures the issues it may have articulated.” Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 138, at 274@75. Thus, it can be concluded that
the language of rights is “not especially informative, despite of its uplifting
character, unless its users link their references to rights to theory that at least
answers some of these questions.” Id. According to Nussbaum, the language of
human capabilities and functioning emerged out of this need. Id.
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define what it means to be denied life, one must rigorously explore what it means to live. Both the systemic protections provided to women by CEDAW and the human capabilities approach reflect that in order for the Convention to guard groups
from physical extinction, it must also protect groups from social
extinction, which not only serves as a symbolic denial of life, but
also creates the conditions necessary for the physical annihilation of a group to take place.
IV. SOLUTION: A MORE SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE
THAT INCORPORATES HUMAN CAPABILITIES THEORY
Modifying the intent requirement to include systems that have
been designed to incapacitate a certain group would provide for
less ambiguity surrounding what actions are expressly prohibited under Article II.159 Under the current definition of genocide,
unless there is a clear intent to destroy a group in whole or in
part, a situation cannot be considered a genocide.160 Since this
heightened standard for mens rea is thought to make genocide
what it is, it becomes incredibly difficult for victim groups, like
the Bahá’ís in Iran, to bring genocide claims under the Convention.161 To change this, the United Nations Secretariat162 should
use Bussbaum’s human capabilities framework163 to clarify the
circumstances under which various acts, such as denial of access

159. Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century—The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 467,
465 (2001).
160. Mai-Linh K. Hong, A Genocide by Any Other Name: Language, Law, and
the Response to Darfur, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 240 (2008).
161. Id. at 260.
162. Article XVI of the Genocide Convention states, “[a] request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting
Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect
of such request.” See Genocide Convention, supra note 24.
163. See generally Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 138.

386

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 43:1

to higher education, inability to bury the dead,164 and the systematic closure of shops and businesses, constitute genocide. 165
By following the innovative approach taken by CEDAW drafters,
revising the definition of genocide can allow for Article II to serve
as more than a “symbolic denunciation of BaRi depredationsK”166
The strong association between genocide and the Holocaust has
made victim groups like the Bahá’ís reluctant to concede that
they are victims of genocide.167 Matthew Lippman, a Professor
at University of Illinois-Chicago, whose research focuses specifically on the development of the Convention, describes harmed
groups that are unable to “capture the flag” of genocide as conceding to ethnic cleansing.168
There should be two standards for showing intent, including a
specific intent standard that is reserved for executive decisionmakers, as well as a general intent requirement imposed on
functionaries.169 Creating a general intent standard that encompasses structural and deeply embedded state sanctioned devices
reinforces that the Convention is not just designed to prosecute,
but also to prohibit extermination and infliction of potentially
lethal pain and suffering.170 Advocates of broadening Article II
to encompass cultural cleansing argue that acts, such as the deliberate desecration of icons, libraries, monuments, and coercive
religious conversions, should be included in the definition.171 The
capabilities approach can be used to create not only a broader
164. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the desecration of Bahá’í cemeteries has occurred across Iran. See IRAN HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER, supra note 3, at 38@39. Family graves have been exhumed by vandals and in such
cases, authorities have prevented families from reburying their dead. Id. In
1981, a Bahá’í cemetery in Tehran was closed and thirteen cemetery employees
were arrested. Id. Bahá’ís have been compelled to bury their dead in an area
reserved by authorities specifically for “infidels.” Id.
165. Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415,
514 (1998).
166. Id. at 536.
167. Lippman, supra note 159, at 536.
168. Further, the 1978 report from the Special Rapporteur on genocide lacked
effective international measures to prevent and punish genocide, while also
failing to provide an obstacle to the perpetration of genocide. Id. The 1985 report echoed the same sentiment, stating, “[i]n its present form, the Convention
. . . must be judged to be not enough.” Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 486.
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intent requirement, but also one that is preventative by identifying functions that are central to human life and tied to the dignity of human beings.172 Under the capabilities approach, the intent prong should ask whether the state deprived a victim group
of basic human capabilities.173
Under a broader definition of physical destruction, a life without dignity and choice for a particular victim group may be
viewed as death to the humanity of its members.174 Incorporating the language of human capabilities into the Convention allows the definition to encompass the concept of human dignity.175 As previously mentioned, scholars lament over the fact
that it has taken atrocities like the Holocaust and gruesome genocides to create awareness of what may constitute a threat or
deprivation of human dignity.176 Nussbaum identifies human
dignity, not by nominal characteristics that human beings have,
but rather, by whether humans manifest those qualities through
action.177 By taking this approach, Nussbaum re-conceptualizes
what it means to be deprived of life.178 Furthermore, using the
human capabilities framework allows the Convention to include
bodily integrity and health.179 A definition that places a greater
emphasis on bodily integrity provides a standard under which a
state or its actors may be held accountable for threatening a victim group with violence or using physical violence to seclude or
suppress it.180
While protecting the concept of genocide from becoming too
amorphous is a valid concern, it should be balanced with the re172. Nussbaum, Women and Equality, supra note 31, at 234.
173. Id. at 243.
174. Id. at 237.
175. Paola Bernardini, Human Dignity and Human Capabilities in Martha
C. Nussbaum, 6 IUSTUM AEQUUM SALUTARE 45, 51 (2010).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 49.
178. Martha Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities, 20 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 21, 24 (2007) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Human Rights] (“Life. Being able to live to the end of human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to not being worth living.”).
179. Nussbaum defines bodily integrity as “being able to move freely from
place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault
and domestic violence.” Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 138, at 287. Bodily
health is defined as “being able to have good health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.” Id.
180. Id. at 294.
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ality that showing specific intent has become increasingly difficult in a post-colonial world.181 Critics of a broader definition of
genocide argue that conflating genocide with other forms of
harm dilutes the fundamental meaning of genocide.182 A predominant concern is that the definition of genocide will become
too far removed from the concept that it is killing.183 Proponents
of a narrow definition of genocide argue, however, that while systemic structures may lead to an actual genocide, these acts must
be in a different category than killing per se, due to the difference
in magnitude.184 The advantage of codifying the human capabilities approach within a general definition of intent is that it will
protect groups like the Bahá’ís in Iran from actors whose behaviors do not fall within the narrow definition of specific intent.185
The ramifications of Bahá’ís having no legal standing under
the Iranian Constitution manifests itself in numerous ways,
from the government’s refusal to recogniRe Bahá’í marriages to
the fact that Bahá’ís of all ages can be expelled from their schools
at any time with no explanation.186 Lastly, one of the most egregious harms to the Bahá’ís is that they are not afforded freedom
of expression or assembly187 and are forced to worship clandestinely to avoid harm.188 Under Bussbaum’s theoryO each of these
would be individually considered a denial of a basic capability.189
Thus, Bahá’ís are living under a regime that completely blights
their ability to act and express themselves.190 Under the capabilities frameworks, Bahá’ís should, at a minimum, have basic entitlements granted to them by the Iranian government.191 One of
181. Hong, supra note 160, at 242.
182. Simon, supra note 26, at 251.
183. During the drafting of the Convention, there were national representatives who tried to include a separate article about cultural genocide. Id. They
were met, however, with resistance by representatives who insisted that genocide should be restricted solely to physical acts. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 270.
186. IRAN HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION CENTER, supra note 3, at 23. Nussbaum
writes that “control of one’s environment” includes “being able to work as a
human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.” Nussbaum, Human
Rights, supra note 178, at 25.
187. Id.
188. Iran Hum. Rts. Documentation Center, supra note 3, at 23.
189. Nussbaum, Human Rights, supra note 178, at 25.
190. Nussbaum, Women and Equality, supra note 31, at 236.
191. See generally id.
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the benefits of a general intent prong that incorporates Nussbaum’s framework is that it will allow victim groups, like the
Iranian Bahá’ís, to show that the state has created mechanisms
to deny them of basic human entitlements that are crucial to
both human survival and progress.192 Having a more systemic
definition of genocide will create a common framework, under
which the global community can agree on the minimum standard of life that should be available to all humans.193 Under this
standard, the presence or absence of basic capabilities will be a
mark of the presence or absence of human life.194
CONCLUSION
The endemic and long-term violence and persecution inflicted
upon the Bahá’í community in Iran reaffirms the importance of
broadening the definition of genocide and incorporating a more
structural approach. The current regime has yet to commit a
mass killing, but instead has created sophisticated state mechanisms designed to slowly erase the eSistence of the Bahá’í comL
munityK Through an incredible show of resilienceO the Bahá’í
community in Iran continues to survive. The international community, however, should be asking at what cost. A community
deprived of the ability to educate its youth, maintain ownership
of its own businesses, and bury its dead is being denied basic and
foundational capabilities that enable communities to meaningfully and equally live within society. Aside from these systemic
in=usticesO Bahá’ís are being killed and imprisoned regularlyK A
definition of genocide that encompasses devices utilized by the
state to debilitate a group would allow for actors, like the Iranian
government, to be held accountable for their actions, without
having to go through the painstaking process of showing that
they had the requisite intent to bring about the physical annihilation of an entire population. While the Convention was created
to punish mass killings, it was also created to prevent them from
occurring. Amending the Convention will enable human rights
activists to take a less reactive and more preventative approach
to protecting vulnerable groups. Genocide will no longer be characterized by death but the preservation of life. Furthermore,

192. Id. at 242@43.
193. Id. at 235.
194. Id.
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amending the Convention may have the broader impact of influencing and broadening discourse surrounding what it means to
live. Life will no longer be defined solely by corporeal existence
but more holistically and fully by what individuals and communities are fundamentally capable of doing. For the Iranian
Bahá’ís, a change in the definition of genocide will immediately
impact their ability to meaningfully engage with the most fundamental aspects of life.
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